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Abstract This study evaluates the cost and the profit efficiency of Italian 
banking sector over the period 2006-2011. Translog stochastic frontiers are 
used for this purpose. Following the intermediation approach, efficiency 
scores are computed from estimating a model with three inputs and three 
outputs. Results indicate that Italian banks perform well, given that the 
average levels of cost and profit efficiency are both around 90% and they are 
quite stable over time. However, there is high heterogeneity in results. 
Differences have been found when banks are classified by size (efficiency 
tends to decrease with size), legal type (cooperatives perform better than 
others) and area (the best performers are in the North East of the country). 
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1. Introduction 
An intense restructuring process of the banking industry has occurred in most countries over the 
last two decades. This has been aimed at fostering the efficiency of individual banks and 
competition and financial stability at national level. As far as the case of Italy is concerned, the 
reform started with the 1990 Amato-Carli Act,  the coming into force of EU Directive II and the 
1993 Consolidated Act. This was a phase of privatisation which included the elimination of entry 
barriers and the possibility to open new branches anywhere in the country. The process of 
institutional reforms has been enriched by other norms, such as the 2002 budget law, the 
262/2005 law and the 353/2006 Legislative Decree which aimed at finalising, among other 
issues, the role of banking foundations in controlling credit institutions. An important force 
pushing for the restructuring of the sector is the EMU which has encouraged the expansion of 
banks‟ activities in foreign markets (on all this see Angelini and Cetorelli 2004; Giannola 2009; 
Messori et al. 2003; Panetta 2003).  
All these facts have led to radical changes in the structure of the Italian banking sector. 
Over-time, there has been: a shift of banking industry from state-owned to private banks; a 
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marginalisation of banking foundations; a consolidation process, which accelerated in the 2000s, 
involving the major Italian banks (Banca Intesa, Banca di Roma, Banco Sicily Bank, Unicredit, 
San Paolo IMI, Capitalia, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Intesa). The outcome of this process is also 
documented  by the substantial reduction in the number of banks (there were 1037 banks in 1993 
and just 706 in 2012) and the increase in bank branches (22133 in 1993 and 32875 in 2012). 
 Given this circumstance, Italian banks have re-examined their business in several ways 
regarding their strategies to foster efficiency and face competition better. Thus, it is of great 
interest to empirically investigate bank performance, given that the industry is now much more 
market-oriented than in the past. To this end, this paper uses the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA) to measure the cost and profit efficiency of almost all Italian banks. In so doing, we 
follow the specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) and, therefore, we exploit the 
specificity of the SFA to estimate efficiency scores net of randomness-effect, and are able to get 
the statistical advantages from estimating the main frontier and the efficiency equation 
simultaneously.  
An aspect of interest in the analysis is related to the period covered, the years between 
2006 and 2011. This was a period of instability in financial markets which has not yet been 
studied in terms of the effects on the efficiency of the Italian banking sector. This article fills this 
gap by considering a sample of about 700 banks observed annually from 2006 to 2011. 
It is also worth noting that the choice of considering both dimension of efficiency 
overcomes the limits arising from analysing only one of them. Indeed, profit efficiency only 
gauges performance properly if banks‟ objectives are restricted to profit maximisation.1 
However, banks tend to minimise costs. Thus, comparing cost and profit helps to understand the 
type of relationship which occurs when minimising costs or maximising profits. Does one 
replace the other, or are they complementarily linked? Besides this potential link, it must be said 
that profit efficiency requires not only technical efficiency and both input and output allocative 
efficiency (as does the concept of cost efficiency), but also an appropriate scale. In this respect, a 
bank cannot be on the profit frontier if it is scale inefficient (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
Despite the great quantity of literature on bank efficiency  - there are exhaustive surveys 
by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fethi and Pasourias, (2010) -  few papers have focused on 
Italy. For instance, Giannola et al. (1997) show that small banks had a value of efficiency in 
1994 that did not differ from the national level, with a significant contribution by small-banks 
from North-East of Italy. Large banks registered the highest inefficiency scores. Giannola and 
Scarfiglieri (1998) argue that cost efficiency and profit efficiency were positively correlated over 
the period 1993-1996. These years are covered by the study of Girardone et al. (2004) which 
differentiate the analysis by geographical area and bank type, i.e. Ltd, Cooperative Banks 
(henceforth CBs) and popular banks. They find that overall cost inefficiency decreased over-time 
and that the best performing group were the CBs followed by the popular banks. At regional 
level, the highest efficiency scores were recorded by north-western banks. According to 
Giordano and Lopes (2006), the CBs recorded high cost and low profit efficiency scores in 1993-
2003. Instead, popular banks experienced a reduction in both efficiencies. Similar evidence is 
found in Giordano and Lopes (2012). Fontani and Vitali (2007) focus on the 1994-2004 period 
and point to the presence of technical progress and scale economies that allowed banking groups 
to achieve substantial improvements in cost efficiency. Again, Dongili et al. (2008) estimate 
                                               
1
 According to some authors profit efficiency is superior to cost efficiency “for evaluating the overall 
performance of the firm” (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997; Fitzpatrick and 
McQuinn, 2005). This view is intuitively based on the fact that profit derives from the maximisation of a 
function which depends on revenues and costs. 
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bank cost and profit efficiency in the major European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the UK) for the years 1995-2005. The results show that in each country banks had high cost 
efficiency and low profit efficiency. Finally, the work by Battaglia et al. (2010) explores the case 
of CBs from 2000 to 2005 and shows that those located in northern Italy achieved higher cost 
efficiency than those others. However, the opposite holds when considering profit efficiency.  
Although the evidence provided by this literature is mixed, three conclusions may be 
drawn. Firstly, larger banks attain lower efficiency levels. The second result relates to higher 
levels of cost efficiency for banks in the North of Italy as opposed to those in the South. Thirdly, 
CBs perform better than other banks in controlling costs. 
 This study contributes to the debate by updating the analysis and showing that Italian 
banks performed well over the 2006-2011 period, with profit and cost efficiency at around 90%. 
However, efficiency was highly heterogeneous. Differences in results emerge when banks are 
classified by size (efficiency tends to decrease with size), legal type (cooperatives perform better 
than others) and area (the best performers are in the North East of the country).  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the method. Section 3 describes the 
data and section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. SFA framework and banks’ cost and profit frontiers 
This section describes the SFA and the frontiers used to measure efficiency. The SFA is a 
stochastic method because it allows banks to be distant from the frontier also for randomness. In 
this respect, SFA differs from the DEA, the non-parametric method mostly used in the efficiency 
literature which supposes that distance from the frontier is explained entirely by inefficiency.
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Another important feature of SFA is that it assigns a density function to the stochastic 
component of the model and, thus, permits the make inference. Inference, however, is not 
specific to SFA, because bootstrapping also makes it possible in a non-parametric framework 
(see Simar and Wilson 1998; 2000). A further advantage of the SFA is derived from the 
specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), in which there is also a model for 
inefficiency to be estimated simultaneously with the main frontier. This specification improves, 
in terms of consistency, previous modelling where one firstly estimates inefficiency using a 
frontier and, secondly, uses the estimated value of efficiency as the dependent variable of a 
subsequent regression (on this “two-step” procedure see Greene (1993)).3 However, the SFA 
requires a functional form to be assigned to the frontier and a distribution for the error (see 
below). 
The empirical analysis is carried out by applying SFA to both cost and profit frontier. The 
following function Fc (.) indicates the minimum cost of producing an output vector y given a 
price vector w, whereas Fp (.) states the maximum profit obtainable from producing y at input 
price w. 
     cccit uvwyFCost expexp,                                                [1] 
     pppit uvwyFProfit  expexp,                                          [1‟] 
                                               
2
 The SFA also appears superior to other parametric methods, such as Thick Frontier Approach, because 
it provides the scores of inefficiency for any decision making unit. 
3 As shown by Lensink and Meesters (2012) and Wang and Schmidt (2002), the two-step approach suffers 
from the fact that the inefficiency is assumed to be identically and independently distributed in the 
main frontier, while it also depends on other variables in the inefficiency equation. In this regards, the 
specification used in this study also addresses the heterogeneity issue, as in Battaglia et al. (2010), Bos 
et al. (2005) and Lensink and Meesters (2012). 
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 As in Berger and Mester (1997), the function [1‟] is an alternative profit function since it 
depends on w and y, whereas actual profits are related to output-prices. Therefore, the alternative 
profit function uses the same variables as the cost function, implying that output-prices are free 
to vary and affect profits (Huizinga et al., 2001). According to Berger and Mester (1997), eq. 
[1‟] is appropriate for measuring profits when there are substantial unmeasured differences in the 
quality of banking services; outputs are not completely variable; output prices are not accurately 
measured; output markets are not perfectly competitive. An exhaustive discussion on alternative 
versus traditional profit efficiency is in Vander-Vennet (2002). 
By referring to eq. [1], the cost efficiency can be expressed as the ratio between the 
minimum level of cost of a potentially efficient bank and the cost level actually observed: 
   
     
 c
ccc
cc u
uvwyF
vwyF
CE  exp
expexp,
exp,
                                          [2] 
while, similarly, profit efficiency is the ratio between the observed banks‟ profit and the 
maximum level of profit achievable in the case of full efficiency 
     
     ppp
ppp
u
vwyF
uvwyF
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
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[3] 
A functional form must be assigned to the frontier, which, in this work, is assumed to be 
the translogarithmic function. It satisfies the assumptions of non-negativity, concavity and linear 
homogeneity with respect to input prices (for a detailed discussion, see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). The cost frontier in the log-linear form is: 
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  [4] 
where Cost is a bank‟s total costs; yj represents the j-th output; wn is the cost of the n-th input; β, 
γ and α are the parameters to be estimated; u is the inefficiency; v is the random error. The 
constraint of homogeneity in relation to the input price ( 1
n
n
 ) must be satisfied because of 
differentiability and the possibility to minimise(maximise) costs(profits). After taking into 
account this constraint, the estimated model is expressed as follows (wr is the price of deposits)
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With regards the profits, the right-hand side replicates the cost function, while the 
dependent variable is now given by banks‟ profit, expressed as 






rw
Profit
log . A data 
transformation has been made because profits may be negative. In the same vein of Berger and 
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 Using a transolg function, the linear homogeneity in factor prices also requires (1) standard 
symmetry ( sjjs    and qnnq   ) and (2) linear restrictions of the cost (or profit) function 
( 0
n
nq  and 0
n
nj ).  
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Mester (1997), Bonin et al. (2005), Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2005), Huizinga et al. (2001) and 
Maudos et al. (2002) we transform profits by adding the absolute value of minimum profit plus 
one to actual profits. This ensures that the function  



  1loglog minProfit  is defined in  
 ,0 . 
Another issue to be addressed when using the SFA regards the distribution to be assigned 
to error. Following some authors (Dongili et al., 2008; Fiordelisi et al., 2010; Turati, 2008), we 
assumed that the random error (vit) is normally distributed with mean zero and the inefficiency 
(uit) is distributed as a truncated normal. It is also assumed that vit and uit are independently and 
identically distributed: 
vit ~ iidN (0, 
2
v
 )                                                               [6] 
uit ~ N
 +
 (z‟η, 2
u
 )                                                             [7] 
where z’η is the linear predictor of the inefficiency equation. The inefficiency component is 
specified as follows: 
 it
K
k
itkkit ezu  
1
                                                         [8] 
where zitk represents the k-th variable that affects the inefficiency of the i-th bank; with k = 1, ..., 
K. t is time and eit the random component. In addition, the inequality e > - z‟η must hold in order 
to ensure the non-negativity of u.  
 
 
3. Data and variables 
Data on banks are from the ABI Banking Data of the Italian Banking Association (ABI), which 
provides the balance sheets of Italian banks from 1993 to the present. In order to ensure 
reliability of data, the period under scrutiny covers the period 2006-2011. This is because the 
implementation of International Accounting Standards (IAS) occurred in 2005 and the individual 
balance sheets before and after the IAS implementation are not comparable.  
A break-down of the sample is presented in table 1. There are 686 banks in 2006, 692 in 
2007, 689 in 2008, 686 in 2009, 648 in 2010 and 631 in the final year. The sample is dominated 
by CBs  (in average 63% over time), followed by Ltd (32%) and popular banks (6%). As can be 
seen, many banks are small and minor (92% of the sample in 2006 and 94% in 2011). In 
addition, the proportion of banks that have their headquarters in the North is 60% of the sample. 
This is a much higher value than that for banks that have their registered offices in the South 
(20%). Table 1 also reports details on banks‟ size. The average total assets ranges from 2,764 
mln euro in 2006 to 3,312 mln euro in 2011. Ltd banks are the category with the largest size (on 
average 8,879 mln euro in total assets in 2011), followed by popular (7,154 mln) and CBs  
(approximately 328 mln in 2011). When considering location,
5
 the big banks are generally in the  
north-western of Italy, where the size is, on average, more than 6,3 mln euro in 2011. This value 
is approximately double that reported by banks in central and north-eastern Italy and nine times 
higher than the average observed for southern banks (table 1).  
                                               
5
 As proposed by the Bank of Italy, bank size is defined by considering loans and deposits, the number of 
employees and of branches, The territorial classification consists of four areas: North-West (Liguria, 
Lombardy, Piedmont, Aosta Valley), North-East (Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino, 
Veneto); Centre (Lazio, Marche, Tuscany, Umbria), South and Islands (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, 
Campania, Molise, Apulia, Sicily and Sardinia). 
6 
 
With regard the variables used in the econometric analysis, it should be noted that there is 
a debate over whether it is better to use the value added (or production) approach or the 
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). These differ mainly in the definition of 
inputs and outputs to be included in the bank frontier. The added value approach considers loans 
and deposits as outputs, while labour and physical capital are inputs. Therefore, it considers 
banks in the same way as it considers manufacturing. In contrast, the intermediation approach 
identifies the loans as outputs and labour, capital and deposits as inputs. In this case, the bank is 
seen as a company that collects and manages funds to provide loans to customers. In this paper, 
variables are used following the intermediation model, which is the appropriate way to measure 
banks‟ efficiency according to Berger and Humphrey (1997). Table 2 displays the variables used 
in estimations. 
We estimate a three-inputs, three-outputs model. On the output-side, there is a certain 
consensus in considering the loans to customers (y1) as the main banking output. Furthermore, in 
line with other authors
6
, we also introduce commission income (y2) in reflection of the fact that 
nowadays banks offer a range of collateral services for which they get gains. The third output is 
securities (y3), composed of loans to other banks, equities and bonds (Barra et al., 2011). With 
regard the inputs, we use labour, capital and deposits. The cost of labour (w1) is calculated as the 
ratio between the personnel expenses and the number of employees, capital cost (w2) is measured 
as the ratio between the expenses that are not considered in other inputs and the banking product 
(x2)
7
 and the cost of deposits (w3) is given by the ratio of interest paid to customers and the value 
of deposits (x3). 
With regard the determinants of efficiency included in eq. [8], we consider four variables 
gauging (i) credit quality, (ii) the solvency of banks, (iii) market structure and (iv) market 
instability at the time of crisis (table 3). Credit quality (z1) is expressed as the ratio between non-
performing loans and total loans.
8
 The variable z2 takes into account riskiness and its effect on 
efficiency: it is calculated as the ratio between regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. 
Thirdly, it is also useful to consider industry concentration as, for instance, in Battaglia et al. 
(2010), Berger and De Young (1997) and Giordano and Lopes (2008). To this end, we use the 
Herfindahl index (z3), which is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of each bank in 
each area. Lastly, the  period under scrutiny involves the current crisis and, so, we include the 
FTSE index (z4) in order to see if there is a relationship between market instability and bank 
efficiency.
9
 Yearly dummy variables are also introduced so as to take into account any other 
time-effect, and are meant to capture what has happened over the years of the crisis, reflecting 
                                               
6
 Barra et al. (2011), Dongili and Zago (2005); Fiordelisi et al. (2010), Giordano and Lopes (2008), 
Hunter and Timme (1995). 
7
 It is worth noting that there are many measurement issues to be addressed in the case of capital. Some 
studies consider the cost of physical capital, calculated as the ratio between the depreciation and the 
sum of tangible assets (Fiordelisi et al., 2010). However, this seems to be restrictive for banks which 
tend to offer online service and, thus, require low levels of physical capital. Another measure of capital 
is proposed by Barra et al. (2011), who calculate the price of capital as the ratio between the sum of 
administrative expenses, depreciation and other operating costs and the number of branches. Giordano 
and Lopes (2008) consider the same numerator used in Barra et al. (2011), but their denominator is 
total funds. The capital cost is also calculated as the ratio between regulatory capital and banking 
product (Fontani and Vitali 2007). 
8
 Some authors (Battaglia et al., 2010; Berger and De Young, 1997; Giordano and Lopes, 2008) calculate 
z1 at individual levels, but this implies that the hypothesis of exogeneity is violated. In this respect, our 
choice to determine the zs at territorial level limits the endogeneity bias.  
9
 The FTSE used in the paper refers to the Italian banks listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. 
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phenomena which are different from those gauged by the other z-variables. It must be said that 
all efficiency-determinants are defined at macro-regional level. While variable z1 is calculated by 
using the location of customers (data are from the Bank of Italy), the factors z2, z3 and z4  are 
determined by aggregating the micro-data of the sample used in this paper. The link between 
data at bank level and regional level has been made by considering the region where the bank‟s 
headquarters are situated. Finally, regressions are augmented by a set of binary variables in order 
to control for any difference in efficiency caused by legal category, geographical location and 
bank size. Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics of the variables included in the cost and 
profit frontiers. 
 
 
Table 1 Description of the sample. 
 Number of banks and size* by year. 
              2006          2007       2008       2009       2010        2011 
 Banks Size Banks  Size Banks Size Banks Size Banks Size Banks  Size 
Area             
North-West 151 6,011 149 6,955 144 8,210 152 7,464 138 5,762 129 6,370 
North-East 241 1,636 242 1,884 242 1,877 239 2,045 231 2,883 230 3,020 
Centre 151 3,250 150 3,106 154 3,238 150 3,381 144 3,182 139 3,418 
South 143 725 151 701 149 712 145 768 135 742 133 736 
             
Legal form             
LTD 218 7,327 218 7,845 222 8,593 233 8,082 207 8,001 193 8,879 
CCB 431 241 436 257 428 278 414 301 406 318 404 328 
Popular 37 5,276 39 6,368 39 5,506 39 6,001 35 6,689 34 7,154 
             
Size             
Minor 514 277 520 244 521 281 517 296 496 342 489 344 
Small 118 2,393 119 2,623 118 2,801 121 2,958 109 2,790 102 3,120 
Medium 32 11,100 35 13,100 33 15,900 29 13,800 29 14,200 27 16,000 
Large 13 25,000 11 28,900 10 30,600 12 31,200 10 32,700 9 40,000 
Major 9 87,800 7 121,000 7 133,000 7 137,000 4 202,000 4 203,000 
             
Total 686 2,764 692 2,983 689 3,253 686 3,268 648 3,177 631 3,312 
Note:  *average value of total assets, expressed as the ratio between the total assets and the 
number of banks of each group. Constant values in mln of euro - NIC Index Istat, base year = 
1995. 
Source: our calculations based on data from ABI. 
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Table 2 Definition of the variables included in the cost and profit functions 
 
 
 
 
Variables  
 
 
Name 
 
 
Description 
 
y1 Loans Loans to customers (Stock variable). It includes current 
accounts, repurchase agreements, mortgages, credit 
cards, personal loans and salary-backed loans, 
transactions relating to financial leasing and factoring, 
business loans, structured debt securities and other 
securities 
 
y2 Commission Income Revenues arising from non-traditional loans and deposits 
of banks  (Flow variable). It includes incomes from 
trading of financial instruments and currencies, custody 
and administration of securities, business consulting, 
management of insurance products, collection and 
payment services, collection services. 
 
y3 Securities Sum of loans to other banks, equities and bonds  (Stock 
variable) 
 
x1 Labour Number of employees 
 
x2 Capital Gross Banking Product 
 
x3 Deposits Debts to customers 
 
w1 Labour cost Ratio between the personnel expenses and the number of 
employees 
 
w2 Cost of capital Ratio between the other expenses (commission expenses, 
operating costs, depreciation of fixed assets, the 
administrative costs that do not relate to personnel 
expenses and the interest expenses that do not relate to 
those calculated on deposits) and the Gross Banking 
Product (that is the sum of loans, direct and indirect 
funding) 
 
w3 Cost of deposits Ratio between the interest expenses and the debts to 
customers 
 
Costs (y, w) 
 
 
 
Profits (y, w) 
Total costs 
 
 
 
Total profits 
w1x1 + w2x2 +  w3x3 = Administrative expenses + 
Depreciation of fixed assets +  Interest expenses + 
Operating costs + Commission expenses  
 
 



  1loglog minProfit  
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Table 3 Definition of variables included in the inefficiency equation 
 
 
 
Table 4 Average values of input and output (2006-2011) 
(constant values in mln of euro - NIC Index Istat, base year = 1995) 
Source: see table 1. 
 
Variables  
 
Name 
 
Description 
z1 Credit Quality Ratio between bad loans and total loans  for each 
areas according to the location of customers. Source: 
Bank of Italy 
 
z2 Solvency index Ratio between the regulatory capital and the risk-
weighted assets for each areas. It is a proxy of the 
risk faced by banks and it takes into account the 
directions in the Basel regulations.   
Risk-weights consider the operational risk (the risk of 
loss due to errors in the management of ordinary 
banking activities), market risk (the risk of loss due 
to the change in value for financial instruments) and 
credit risk (risk of loss due to insolvent 
counterparties) 
 
z3 Herfindahl index Sum of squared market shares of each bank (total 
assets of each bank over the total assets of each area),  
 
z4 FTSE Index FTSE measuring the banking performance in  
Milan Stock Exchange 
 
d2006, d2007, 
d2008, d2009 d2010 
 
Time Annual binary variables. 2011 is the controlling 
group-year 
 
d_ltd, d_pop 
 
Legal form Dummies for legal form. CCB is the controlling 
group 
 
d_smallest, d_med, 
d_large, d_major 
 
Size Dummies for size.  small-banks is the controlling 
group  
d_nw, d_centre, 
d_south 
 
Geographical 
location 
 
Dummies for geographical areas. North-East is  the 
controlling group 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Cost 3766 161456.60 856024 378.2148 20100000 
Π 3766 10226.17 108520 -1040415 4395613 
Profit 3766 1050642 108520 1 5436029 
y1 = loans to customers 3766 1712072 8435175 1.45 182000000 
y2 = commission income 3766 27212.08 133176 0.72 2880022 
y3 = securities 3766 716470.30 5922604 206.47 154000000 
w1 = labour cost 3758 53.14 20.50 7.12 712.77 
w2 = cost of capital 3766 0.0595 1.0283 0.000048 44.81 
w3 = cost of financial 3741 0.0135 0.0344 0.000008 1.25 
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4. Econometric results 
4.1 Stochastic frontier estimations 
The approach of considering the SFA frontier and the equation of inefficiency in one single 
model yields a set of estimated parameters which is presented here in two different tables (tables 
5 and 6) for ease of exposition.  
Table 5 presents the results obtained when estimating the cost and profit frontiers by 
using the R-project software. The estimated parameters of a translog function are not 
interpretable in economic terms, but it is still worth noting that, except for γ2 and γ12, they are 
always highly significant.
10
 One meaningful result regards the value of gamma, which is the ratio 
between the variance of the inefficiency component and the variance of the composite error. It is 
close to unity in both the cost and profit frontiers, indicating that almost all of the distance from 
best practises depends on inefficiency. This evidence is statistically supported by the Likelihood 
Ratio test, which verifies the correct model specification of a SFA à la Battesi and Coelli (1995). 
The test is based on the null hypothesis that all the parameters in the inefficiency equation [eq. 8] 
are equal to zero. Phrased differently, if the null hypothesis is accepted, then the OLS estimate 
will be consistent because the inefficient term u is zero and hence the composite error comprises 
only randomness. Results indicate that the LR is 805.13 and 4570 in cost and profit frontiers 
respectively and, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% (taking the critical values of the 
chi-square distribution as tabulated by Kodde and Palm (1986) (table 5).     
The estimates retrieved from the inefficiency model are displayed in table 6. Something 
that is immediately evident is that all variables are significant at least at 5%. With regards to the 
role of each factor, we find the presence of a positive relationship between bad loans (z1) and 
banks inefficiency, whatever the frontier (cost or profit): low credit quality results in high 
(lower) inefficiency (efficiency). This contrasts with Battaglia et al. (2010) who find no 
significant relationship between cost efficiency and bad loans over the period 2000-2005.
11
 The 
estimated coefficient of solvency index (z2) is always negative and suggests that banks‟ cost and 
profit efficiency increases with capital adequacy: bank performance increases when banking risk 
is low. This result means that an increase in banks capitalisation to meet operational and market 
risk induces an improvement in bank efficiency in cost and profit frontiers. The effect of market 
concentration on efficiency differs according to the frontier. In case of costs, the coefficient is 
negative and indicates that a higher concentration allows higher cost efficiency levels to be 
reached.
12
 The opposite holds when considering profits. The FTSE index reflects the changes 
due to the current crisis. The estimated negative relationship between the FTSE and inefficiency 
means that an increase in the index corresponds to a reduction in inefficiency levels. Looking at 
the actual dynamics of the FTSE, we see a decrease in financial transactions in 2008, 2010 and 
                                               
10
 We also implement a LR test to verify the correct functional form of the frontiers. Under the null 
hypothesis there is the Cobb-Douglas model. We always reject the null hypothesis at 1% in favour of 
the translog. 
11
 In line with the hypothesis of bad management (Berger and De Young, 1997; Williams, 2004),   
Giordano and Lopes (2006) give a possible explanation for the relationship between credit-quality and 
inefficiency. Indeed, because of managerial choices, the increased cost efficiency is a result of cost 
savings in screening and monitoring activities. This, however, may have negative consequences on 
credit-quality and risk.  
12
 Similar results are found in Fontani and Vitali (2007), but contrast with those of Turati (2008), 
according to which a higher concentration involves lower cost efficiency levels. However, these two 
papers consider the Herfindahl index calculated at national level, while we refer to territorial markets.  
11 
 
2011. Given the signs of our estimates, it is possible to argue that the annual negative changes in 
the FTSE in these three years caused an increase in the inefficiency of the Italian banking 
industry. As regards the annual dummy variables, we find that in 2006, 2007 and 2008 the 
inefficiency levels were lower than in 2011. The opposite is true for the years 2009 and 2010 
when there were lower efficiency scores than in 2011. 
The positive coefficients associated with territorial dummies highlight the role of location 
in efficiency. Other things being equal, banks in north eastern Italy perform better than others, 
whatever the frontier. Moreover, estimations reveal that banks with their headquarters in the 
south of Italy perform less well than north eastern institutions, but better than those in the Centre 
and North West. It is also important to underline that cooperatives banks are the best performing 
type of bank. Mixed results are found when considering dummies associated with size, where the 
effect varies according to the frontier. The understanding of size effect on banking efficiency is 
also discussed in the next paragraph. 
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Table 5 Cost and profit frontiers of Italian banks.  
             Translog estimates over the 2006-2011 period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                         
  
 
Significance levels: „***‟ = 0.01; „**‟ = 0.001; „*‟ = 0.05; „.‟ = 0.1; „ „ = 1. 
+ LR critical value as tabulate by Kodde and Palm (1986) 
 Source: see table 1 
 Cost Profit                       
β0 -5.44***  10.18*** 
β1  0.73***  0.02 
β2 -0.20*** -0.29*** 
β3  0.38***  0.16*** 
γ1  1.60***  1.18*** 
γ2  0.03 -0.05 
β11  0.04***  0.01*** 
β12 -0.06*** -0.03*** 
β13 -0.03***  0.05*** 
β22  0.03***  0.02*** 
β23  0.02*** -0.07*** 
β33  0.01***  0.03*** 
γ11 -0.05*** -0.002 
γ12 -0.004 -0.02 
γ22  0.05***  0.06*** 
α11 -0.06*** -0.03*** 
α12  0.07***  0.08*** 
α13 -0.02* -0.06*** 
α21  0.07***  0.03*** 
α22 -0.05*** -0.03*** 
α23 -0.002***  0.01 
   
2   119.43* 
 
260.38**
* 
γ=
2
2

 u
  0.9997*** 
 
0.9999**
* 
Log-likelihood  363.15  1557.894 
   
LR test 805,13* 4570* 
 (34,2)
+ (34,2)+ 
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Table 6 Cost and profit inefficiency equations Italian bank. 
                         Estimates over the 2006-2011 period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 Significance levels: „***‟ = 0.01; „**‟ = 0.001; „*‟ = 0.05; „.‟ = 0.1; „ „ = 1. 
 Source: see table 1. 
 
 
4.2 Average levels of cost efficiency in Italian banks 
Table 7 shows some descriptive statistics for the estimation of cost and profit efficiency scores 
from 2006 to 2011. The average values of cost and profit efficiency are both slightly higher than 
90%. From the cost point of view, Italian banks would have needed only 90% of the inputs used 
in offering banking services. They earned 90% of their potential profits and, thus, a 10% 
recovery of profitability would have been possible without increasing inputs. On average, this 
evidence indicates that Italian banks perform similarly when they control costs or generate 
profits. We can see from table 8 that this holds even when considering results year-by-year: the 
average level of efficiency is 91% in both cases in 2006, declines up to 2008 and shows a slight 
recovery in the two subsequent years. In 2011, cost and profit efficiency scores are around 90%, 
a lower value than that observed for 2010. While the average values of cost and profit efficiency 
are comparable, a certain heterogeneity exists between and within groups. The density function 
of cost efficiency differs from that of profit (figure 1). Profit efficiency is more dispersed than 
cost efficiency, and the standard deviations are 0.1162 and 0.0825 respectively. Again, the 
median cost efficiency is 92.4%, while, in the case of profits, it is 94.54%. Finally, for 1% of the 
 Cost Profit 
z1 = bad loans 615.77* 1580.20*** 
z2 = solvency index -868.05* -733.66*** 
z3 = Herfindahl index -2875.70* 4728.90*** 
z4 = FTSE -0.03* -0.09*** 
d2006 -105.64* -236.19*** 
d2007 -73.35* -658.29*** 
d2008 -859.18* -4062.70*** 
d2009 163.84* -213.31*** 
d2010 121.89* -1196.20*** 
d_ltd 684.34* 3004.90*** 
d_pop 892.63* 2555.40*** 
d_minor -65.13* 16.50*** 
d_med -402.49* 760.80*** 
d_large -170.87* 1004.60*** 
d_major 152.38* 1114.10*** 
d_nw 607.00* 273.02*** 
d_centre 262.75* 107.54*** 
d_south 144.99* 157.71*** 
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banks, cost efficiency ranges from 4.89% to 50%, while the upper value of profit efficiency is 
34.41% for 1% of banks (table 7). 
 Marked differences in results emerge when disaggregating the analysis by year and bank 
category (table 8). Whit regards the banks‟ institutional type, we find that cooperatives perform 
better than other categories in both frontiers and in every year. On average, over the 2006-2011 
period, cooperatives register a cost inefficiency of 3.3% and a profit inefficiency of 4.1%. These 
are much lower values than those estimated for Ltd, which are about 14% inefficient, whatever 
the frontier, and popular banks, which have a gap of 17,1% from  the cost frontier and almost 
13% in the case of profits. Over time, we see a common decline at the beginning of the period, a 
recovery in 2009 and 2010 and a new loss of efficiency in 2011. These time-changes do not alter 
the empirical regularity according to which cooperatives gain more in generating profits than in 
controlling costs (although the gap in efficiency scores is not wide and disappears in 2011). The 
same applies for popular banks, even though the levels of efficiency are always lower than those 
registered for cooperatives and the within-group gap between cost and profit efficiency is larger 
than that revealed for CBs. The picture changes for Ltd, which show a different pattern in 
efficiency: except for 2010, their cost efficiency is always higher than their profit efficiency. 
Interestingly, at the end of the period, the distance between profit and cost behaviour increased, 
as a consequence of the sharp reduction in 2011 profitability. 
Other insights derive from classifying banks by size. Three main facts emerge. Firstly, 
minor banks perform better than others, whatever the frontier: their inefficiency is less than 7% 
in profitability and 8.5% in managing costs. What we learn from this is that the minor banks, the 
majority of the Italian banking sector (table 1), make better use of inputs and outputs than any 
other group. This is always true. The same thing applies for small banks from a profitability 
point of view, while mixed evidence is found from cost-side  (where small banks might reduce 
inputs by 14,53%, a value close to that (14,16%) observed for large banks and much higher than 
the cost inefficiency of medium banks (10,22%). Secondly and more in general, we find a sort of 
size-effect in efficiency. Data clearly indicate that efficiency decreases when size increases. This 
scale effect is evident in profitability scores recorded in 2009 and 2011, whereas, in the other 
years, it applies for the first four bank-groups (we find that major banks perform better than large 
banks in generating profits in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2008 and over the entire 2006-2011 period). A 
noteworthy fact is that profit efficiency in 2006-2011 is 93.19% for minor banks, 87.29% for 
small banks, 72.86% for medium banks and 60.01% for large banks. The last group is that of the 
major banks, which registers a profit efficiency of 63.98%, a higher value than that observed for 
large banks, but sharply lower than that observed for any other sub-sample. Similarly, a size 
effect is revealed on the cost side. In this case, with the exception of small banks, the average 
scores for the six-year period 2006-2001 are 91.56% for minor banks, 89.78% for medium-sized 
banks, 85.85 for large banks and only 77.60% for major banks. This negative relationship 
between size and cost efficiency is at work in every year. A final element to be pointed out 
regards the fact that cost and profit efficiencies record very narrow values for minor and small 
banks (with cost efficiency slightly higher than profit efficiency). The contrary holds for other 
groups: medium, large and major banks perform better when controlling costs than when 
producing profits. The difference in efficiency scores is high at any time and assumes remarkable 
numbers for 2011 when banks tended to improve their behaviour in managing costs and 
experienced a drastic worsening in profitability (table 8). 
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Table 7 Some descriptive statistics of cost and profit efficiency scores (2006-2011)  
 
Cost Efficiency 
 
 Percentiles  Smaller values 
  1% 0.5008 0.0490 
   5% 0.7830 0.0548 
   10% 0.8387 0.0612 
   25% 0.8950 0.0672 
 
Obs 3741 
50% 0.9245 
  
Mean 0.9021 
    
Std. 0.08 
 
 
Larger values 
   75% 0.9413 0.9737 
   90% 0.9523 0.9788 
 
Variance 0.0068 
95% 0.9566 0.9801 
 
Skewness -486.57 
99% 0.9643 0.9855   Kurtosis 3.595.15 
 
     Profit Efficiency 
 
 Percentiles  Smaller values 
   1% 0.3441 0.000001 
   5% 0.68178 0.0872 
   10% 0.8140 0.1142 
   25% 0.9112 0.1190 
 
Obs 3741 
50% 0.9454 
  
Mean 0.9048 
    
Std. 0.11 
 
 
Larger values 
   75% 0.9571 0.9898 
   90% 0.9629 0.9905 
 
Variance 0.0135 
95% 0.9656 0.9908 
 
Skewness -3.729.905 
99% 0.9713 0.9909   Kurtosis 1.896.607 
Source: see table 1 
 
 
Figure 1 Density of cost and profit efficiency  
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Table 8 Cost and profit efficiency of Italian banks by legal form, size and area (2006-2011) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011 
Cost Efficiency 
       All sample 0.9156 0.8955 0.8766 0.9008 0.906 0.9207 0.9021 
Legal form 
       Ltd 0.8751 0.8557 0.8203 0.8634 0.8703 0.8866 0.8608 
Popular 0.8583 0.8182 0.7799 0.8106 0.8419 0.8782 0.8290 
Cooperative Banks 0.9378 0.9203 0.9129 0.9256 0.9263 0.9402 0.9270 
        Size 
       Minor 0.9286 0.9117 0.8996 0.9123 0.9151 0.9278 0.9156 
Small 0.8675 0.8438 0.8005 0.8612 0.8748 0.8874 0.8547 
Medium 0.9117 0.8806 0.8607 0.9032 0.9092 0.9290 0.8978 
Large 0.8753 0.8581 0.7734 0.8779 0.8552 0.9236 0.8584 
Major 0.8551 0.7745 0.6759 0.7787 0.7881 0.8586 0.7760 
        Area 
       North West 0.8696 0.8503 0.8315 0.8681 0.8794 0.8857 0.8635 
North East 0.9388 0.9138 0.8974 0.9230 0.9394 0.9448 0.9258 
Centre 0.9183 0.9054 0.8800 0.8999 0.8855 0.9172 0.9007 
South 0.9163 0.8983 0.8816 0.8959 0.8940 0.9174 0.9000 
Profit Efficiency 
       All sample 0.9191 0.8993 0.8814 0.9102 0.9298 0.8930 0.9048 
Legal form 
       Ltd 0.8436 0.7962 0.7731 0.8293 0.8685 0.7844 0.8138 
Popolar 0.9105 0.8734 0.8345 0.8692 0.9187 0.8658 0.8762 
Cooperative Banks 0.9529 0.9497 0.9383 0.9511 0.9570 0.9459 0.9490 
        Size 
       Minor 0.9398 0.9320 0.9154 0.9368 0.9470 0.9232 0.9319 
Small 0.8909 0.8565 0.8413 0.8747 0.9108 0.8687 0.8729 
Medium 0.7895 0.6892 0.6275 0.7712 0.8302 0.6789 0.7286 
Large 0.6783 0.5959 0.5444 0.6525 0.6840 0.4066 0.6001 
Major 0.8225 0.7152 0.6719 0.5718 0.7718 0.2391 0.6398 
        Area 
       North West 0.8746 0.8320 0.8093 0.8590 0.8992 0.8334 0.8499 
North East 0.9464 0.9298 0.9157 0.9367 0.9505 0.9172 0.9325 
Centre 0.8998 0.8865 0.8642 0.9022 0.9084 0.8790 0.8894 
South 0.9346 0.9254 0.9104 0.9229 0.9452 0.9237 0.9264 
 
      Source: see table 1 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper evaluates cost and profit efficiency in the Italian banking sector over the years from 
2006 to 2011, a period of structural reforms and increasing competition. By using a stochastic 
frontier approach on a wide single sample of banks, the study provides evidence on the likely 
mis-estimation involved when considering exclusively cost or profit efficiency. 
When referring to the overall results, no biased image of efficiency appears to occur 
given that the average levels of cost and profit efficiency are both around 90% and stable over 
time. The picture changes when the sample of banks is divided into sub-groups. For instance, the 
groups of medium, large and major banks perform better when controlling costs than when 
generating profits. In such cases, studies which only focus on the cost frontier will overestimate 
the capability of the Italian banking industry to be efficient. With regards these three groups of 
banks, it is worth emphasising that profit efficiency is quite a bit lower than cost efficiency and 
that they diverge further in 2011. As the profit measure we use admits the existence of market 
power in setting the prices of output, the evidence signals that Italian medium and large sized 
banks suffer the increase of competition in national and global markets at the time of the current 
financial crisis. Two different results have been found for minor-small banks. They not only 
perform significantly better than medium, large and major-sized banks, whatever the frontier, but 
their cost and profit efficiency scores are similar in size. Therefore, being small is an advantage 
in performing well. It also emerges that for all the years included in the analysis, cooperatives 
banks attained the highest efficiency scores. They even perform better than the Ltd, which are all 
the banks involved in recent radical changes.  
The main conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the Italian large and major-
sized banks face the competitive pressures in international financial markets more than the others 
do and this tends to reduce the opportunity to make profits. Within this scenario, there are some 
banks, the smallest and those organised as CBs, that perform better than all the others because, 
evidentially, they still enjoy of a certain degree of monopolistic power in the very restricted local 
markets where they operate.  
 
 
18 
 
 
References 
 
Angelini, P., Cetorelli, N. (2004) Gli effetti delle modifiche normative sulla concorrenza nel 
mercato creditizio. In Panetta F. (Ed.): Il sistema bancario italiano negli anni novanta. Il 
Mulino: Bologna. 
 
Barra C., Destefanis S., Lubrano Lavadera G. (2011) Risk Regulation: the Efficiency of Italian 
Cooperative Banks, Working Paper 290. Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, 
University of Naples. 
 
Battaglia F., Farina V., Fiordelisi F., Ricci O. (2010) The Efficiency of Cooperative Banks: the 
Impact of Environmental Economic Conditions, Applied Financial Economics, 20(17), 
1363-1376.  
 
Battese G.E., Coelli T.J. (1995) A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function for Panel Data, Empirical Economics, 20(2), 325–332. 
 
Berger A.N., De Young R. (1997) Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency in Commercial Banking, 
Journal Banking and Finance, 21, 849-870. 
 
Berger A.N., Humphrey D.B. (1997) Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey 
and Directions for Future Research, European Journal of Operation Research, 98, 175–
212. 
 
Berger A.N., Mester L.J. (1997) Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the 
Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 895-947. 
 
Bonin, J.P., Hasan, I., Wachtel, P. (2005) Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition 
Countries, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 2155–2178. 
 
Bos J.W.B., Heid F., Koetter M., Kolari J.W., Kool C.J.M. (2005) Inefficient or just Different? 
Effects of Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency Scores, Working Paper 15. Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
 
Dongili P., Rossi S.P.S., Zago A. (2008) Efficienza e competitività delle banche italiane: un 
confronto con alcuni sistemi bancari europei. In Cella G., Zago A. (Eds.): Competitività 
ed efficienza dell‟economia italiana: fattori sistemici e valutazioni quantitative. Il Mulino: 
Bologna. 
 
Dongili P., Zago A. (2005) Bad Loans and Efficiencies in Italian Bank, Working Paper 28. 
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, University of Verona. 
 
Fethi, M.D., Pasourias, F. (2010) Assessing Bank Efficiency and Performance with Operational 
Research and Artificial Intelligence Techniques: a Survey, European Journal of 
Operational Research, 204, 189-198. 
 
19 
 
Fiordelisi F., Marques-Ibanez D., Molyneux P. (2010) Efficiency and Risk in European Banking, 
Working Paper 1211. European Central Bank. 
 
Fitzpatrick P., McQuinn K. (2005) Measuring Bank Profit Efficiency, Research Technical Paper 
3. Economic Analysis and Research Department, Central Bank and Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland. 
 
Fontani A., Vitali L. (2007) L’efficienza di costo dei gruppi bancari italiani: un’analisi mediante 
frontiera stocastica, Working Paper. Department of Economics and Business, Luiss, 
Rome.  
 
Giannola A., Lopes A., Ricci C., Scarfiglieri G. (1997) Divari territoriali ed efficienza del 
sistema bancario italiano. In Quintieri B. (Ed.): Finanza, istituzioni e sviluppo regionale. 
Il Mulino: Bologna. 
 
Giannola, A. (2009) Bank Mergers and Credit Allocation Among Italian Regions. In Silipo  D.B. 
(Ed.): The Banks and the Italian Economy. Springer Phisyca-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg. 
 
Giannola A., Scarfiglieri G. (1998) Cost vs Profit Efficiency, Nontraditional Activities and 
Financial Capital: an European Perspective, Working Paper. 5th Financial Conference at 
Università di Tor Vergata, Rome. 
 
Giordano L., Lopes A. (2006) Preferenza al rischio e qualità degli impieghi come determinanti 
dell'efficienza del sistema bancario italiano. In Giannola A. (Ed.): Riforme istituzionali e 
mutamento strutturale. Mercati, imprese e istituzioni in un sistema dualistico. Carocci 
Editore: Rome. 
 
Giordano L., Lopes A. (2008) L‟efficienza del sistema bancario italiano in un contesto dualistico 
e la rilevanza della dimensione e degli aspetti giuridici, Il Risparmio, 2. 
 
Giordano L. - Lopes A. (2012), Le banche italiane tra consolidamento e recuperi di efficienza 
(1998-2008). Una promessa mantenuta?, in Giannola A., Lopes A., Sarno D. (Eds.) I 
problemi dello sviluppo economico e del suo finanziamento nelle aree deboli, Carocci 
Editore, Rome.   
 
Girardone C., Molyneux P., Gardener E.P.M. (2004) Analysing the Determinants of Bank 
Efficiency: the Case of Italian Banks, Applied Economics, 36(3), 215-227. 
 
Greene W.H. (1993), The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis, in The Measurement of 
Productivity Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, Oxford University Press: New 
York, 92-250. 
 
Huizinga, H.P., Nelissen, J.H.M., Vander Vennet, R. (2001) Efficiency Effects of Bank Mergers 
and Acquisitions in Europe, Working Paper 088/3. Tinbergen Institute. 
 
Hunter W.C., Timme S.G. (1995) Core Deposits and Physical Capital: a Re-examination of Bank 
Scale Economies with Quasi-Fixed Inputs, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(1), 
165-185. 
20 
 
 
Kodde D., Palm F. (1986) Wald Criteria for Jointly Testing Equality and Inequality Restrictions, 
Econometrica, 54(5), 1243-1248. 
 
Kumbhakar S.C., Lovell C.A.K. (2000) Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Lensink R., Meesters A. (2012) Institutions and Bank Performance: a Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 
 
Maudos J., Pastor J.M., Perez F., Quesada J. (2002) Cost and Profit Efficiency in European 
Banks, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, 
12(1), 33-58. 
 
Messori M., Tamburini R., Zazzaro A., (2003) Il sistema bancario italiano, Carocci Editore: 
Rome. 
 
Panetta F. (2003), Evoluzione del sistema bancario e finanziamento dell’economia nel 
Mezzogiorno, Tema di Discussione 467, Bank of Italy, Rome. 
 
Sealey C..W., Lindley J.T. (1977) Input, output and a theory of production and cost at depository 
financial institutions, The Journal of Finance, 4. 
 
Simar L., Wilson P.W. (1998) Sensitivity Analysis of Efficiency Scores: how to Bootstrap in 
Nonparametric Frontier Models, Management Science, 44, 49–61. 
 
Simar L., Wilson P.W. (2000) A General Methodology for Bootstrapping in Nonparametric 
Frontier Models, Journal of Applied Statistics, 27, 779– 802. 
 
Turati G. (2008) La valutazione del grado di concorrenza nell’industria bancaria negli anni 
Novanta. In Cella G., Zago A. (Eds.): Competitività ed efficienza dell‟economia italiana: 
fattori sistemici e valutazioni quantitative, Il Mulino: Bologna.  
 
Vander Vennet, R. (2002) Cost and profit efficiency of financial conglomerates and universal 
banking in Europe, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34, 254-282. 
 
Wang H.J., Schimdt P. (2002) One-Step and Two-Step Estimation of the Effect of Exogenous 
Variables on Technical Efficiency Levels, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18, 129-144. 
 
Williams J. (2004) Determining Management Behaviour in European Banking, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 28, 2427-2460. 
 
 
